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Abstract
This paper describes the modelling of a two multicast group key management protocols in a ﬁrst-
order inductive model, and the discovery of previously unknown attacks on them by the automated
inductive counterexample ﬁnder Coral. These kinds of protocols had not been analysed in a
scenario with an active intruder before. Coral proved to be a suitable tool for a job because, unlike
most automated tools for discovering attacks, it deals directly with an open-ended model where the
number of agents and the roles they play are unbounded. Additionally, Coral’s model allows us
to reason explicitly about lists of terms in a message, which proved to be essential for modelling the
second protocol. In the course of the case studies, we also discuss other issues surrounding multicast
protocol analysis, including identifying the goals of the protocol with respect to the intended trust
model, modelling of the control conditions, which are considerably more complex than for standard
two and three party protocols, and eﬀective searching of the state space generated by the model,
which has a much larger branching rate than for standard protocols.
Keywords: Security protocol analysis, group multicast key management
1 Introduction
In terms of analysing the standard corpus of two and three party protocols
given in [7], the ﬁeld of cryptographic security protocol analysis can be said
to be saturated. Much research attention has now turned to trying to widen
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the scope of the techniques, e.g. to group protocols, [14,27,24]. The term
‘group protocol’ refers to a protocol (or suite of sub-protocols) for establishing
a secure key between an unbounded number of agents. This may take the form
of a single key-establishment run between the agents, or a series of requests to
join and leave a group with associated key updates. Some protocols involve a
trusted key server. Signiﬁcant attacks on group protocols have appeared in the
literature, but these have been discovered by patient pen and paper analysis,
[22]. Attempts to extend automatic tools to analyse such protocols have had
mixed results (see §2). Taghdiri and Jackson, [27], published an analysis of a
protocol for group multicast key management proposed by Tanaka and Sato,
[28]. They were able to ﬁnd major ﬂaws and proposed a new, improved version
of the protocol. However, their model was rather weak: in particular, it did
not include an active attacker. In this paper, we investigate their improved
protocol using Coral, [24], and show how it discovered two new attacks
just as serious as the original ones. Additionally we look at the Iolus key
management protocol, [18], which was analysed in Taghdiri’s MSc thesis, [26],
and thought to be secure. Again Coral was able to ﬁnd an attack.
To carry out the analysis, Coral’s model had to be developed to include
state information not always included in the trace of messages exchanged,
such as the current group key held by the key server, and the current time,
expressed as the number of events that have taken place in the trace so far.
The reasons for this will be made clear in the description of the case studies
below.
In successfully modelling and attacking these protocols, we have given
further evidence for the utility of the Coral approach; though run times
are typically slow, we can very quickly adapt the Horn-clause model to new
kinds of protocol. Additionally, the attacks discovered are signiﬁcantly longer
than those typically found in the Clark-Jacob corpus, [7], and those found by
Coral before, [24]. To achieve really fast attack discovery times on these
protocols, it should be possible to adapt purpose built protocol analysis tools,
though signiﬁcant work may be required. We examine this possibility in §5.
The paper is organised as follows: in §2, we review previous work on
group protocol analysis. In §3 we describe the ﬁrst case study, on Taghdiri
and Jackson’s improved version of the Tanaka-Sato protocol. The second
case study, on the Iolus protocol, follows in §4. Throughout the case studies,
we highlight some general issues about the modelling of multicast protocols.
These points are summarised in §5, where we discuss the lessons learned and
the problems that remain to be solved. §6 contains conclusions and plans for
further work.
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2 Background
The ﬁeld of cryptographic security protocol analysis is now far too large to
cover here. A recent survey can be found in [15]. In this section, we will brieﬂy
survey previous work speciﬁc to group protocol analysis.
Perhaps the ﬁrst formal analysis of a group protocol was by Paulson. He
investigated a recursive authentication protocol proposed by Bull and Otway,
[6], as part of his development of the inductive method, [21]. Paulson was
able to model it in the general case, i.e. for any number of participants, and
prove some security properties for arbitrarily-sized groups. Paulson’s method
uses a typed higher-order logic formalism, and poses security properties as
conjectures about properties of the trace. These properties are then proved by
induction on traces in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. However,
if there is a ﬂaw in the protocol, Paulson’s method provides no automated
support for ﬁnding the attack.
Coral, [24], has been used to discover attacks on the Asokan–Ginzboorg
protocol for key establishment in an ad-hoc wireless network, [2]. Coral uses
a ﬁrst-order version of Paulson’s protocol model, and searches for counterex-
amples to the security property under consideration, i.e. it searches for attacks
when the protocol is ﬂawed. Inference is carried out by an adapted version
of the ﬁrst-order theorem prover Spass, [29], using the refutation complete
‘proof by consistency’ strategy, [8]. Coral searches the inﬁnite model of the
system directly, with no parameterisation with respect to sessions, roles, size
of the group etc. In addition to standard subsumption and tautology check-
ing, a small set of domain-speciﬁc reduction rules are used to prune the search
space. The use of an inductive model allowed the speciﬁcation of the Asokan–
Ginzboorg protocol for a group of unbounded size, which lead to the discovery
of distinct attacks on groups of size two and then three while investigating the
same security property.
Several signiﬁcant attacks on the CLIQUES protocol suite, [3], were found
by Pereira and Quisquater as a result of a programme of manual analysis,
[22]. The CLIQUES protocol suite contains a number of protocols for estab-
lishment of groups, and groups within groups, each with their own secure key.
Extensive use is made of Diﬃe-Hellman style exponentiation, [10]. Pereira
and Quisquater proposed a method for converting the problem of the intruder
obtaining a particular term to the solution of a system of linear equations.
Using this method, they were able to ﬁnd weaknesses in every protocol they
examined. Often, the attacks involved quite imaginative behaviour by the
intruder, e.g. being accepted as a member of a group of size 4, and then using
the values learnt in that key establishment session to force a group of size 3,
intended to exclude him, to use a key that he knows. One clear lesson from
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Pereira and Quisquater’s work is that the design of these kinds of protocols is
extremely tricky. It is easy to understand how the designers of the CLIQUES
protocols failed to see such attacks. This strengthens the case for the use of
formal methods in their design.
Meadows used the NRL protocol analyser (NPA) to tackle the Group Do-
main of Interpretation (GDOI) protocol suite, as part of an eﬀort to introduce
formal methods to the design stage of protocol development, [16]. GDOI is
a method for group key management involving a trusted key server. NPA
could not handle the inﬁnite data structures required for a general model of
the protocol, so a concrete abstraction of the protocol was made, restricting
phase two to the distribution of one ‘security association key’. NPA was able
to ﬁnd a type ﬂaw in the protocol, which was ﬁxed in later versions of GDOI.
However, Meadows’ attempt to use NPA to rediscover the Pereira-Quisquater
attacks on the CLIQUES suite was less successful, [14]. NPA was extended
to handle the Diﬃe-Hellman exponentiation operation, but could not ﬁnd the
attacks described in [22].
The designers of the protocol speciﬁcation language CAPSL, [9], have re-
cently turned their attention to group protocols in the development of an
extended language, MuCAPSL, [17]. After translating the GDH.2 protocol,
[25], to their intermediate language MuCIL they were able to discover a type
ﬂaw. However, their analysis requires the number of group members to be
set in advance, which can prejudice the chances of discovering an attack. The
designers of the HLSPL protocol language, [23], have also been working on
extending their coverage to group protocols, though no results of this work
were available at the time of writing this paper.
Taghdiri and Jackson, [27], reported results from the modelling of a multi-
cast key management scheme proposed by Tanaka and Sato, [28]. This proto-
col was designed for a scenario where the group is highly dynamic, i.e. agents
join and leave the group frequently. The idea was to minimise the number
of key updates required by supplying keys to agents on demand. Taghdiri
and Jackson formalised a model for the protocol in the Alloy speciﬁcation
language, [12], and used Alloy’s SAT checker to search for counterexamples
to desirable properties of the protocol. Several counterexamples were found,
the most serious one indicating that current members of the group will accept
as valid messages broadcast by ex-members of the group. Taghdiri and Jack-
son proposed an improved protocol. However, their formal protocol model
diﬀered from the norm established over the last 25 years in that no active
attacker was included. In the rest of this paper, we explain how we modelled
and analysed both Taghdiri and Jackson’s improved protocol, and the Iolus
key management protocol treated in Taghdiri’s MSc thesis (and considered to
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be secure), [26], using our inductive counterexample discovery tool, Coral.
We discovered that neither of these protocols are secure in the presence of an
active attacker, even if he is weaker than the Dolev-Yao intruder generally
used in automated protocol analysis, [11].
3 The Tanaka–Sato/Taghdiri–Jackson Protocol
The protocol that Tanaka and Sato originally proposed, [28], was primarily
concerned with minimising the burden of key updates in terms of network
traﬃc and processor time. Two main design features were introduced for
this purpose: the ﬁrst was the division of the group into subgroups, each
under the management of a key distribution server (KDS). The communication
between the KDSs is assumed to be not only secure but also conducted under
a reliable totally ordered multicast protocol (RTOMP). Taghdiri and Jackson,
[27], modelled this by assuming that as soon as one KDS updates its key, all
the other KDSs instantaneously update theirs, eﬀectively reducing the model
to a single server. In our model, we also restrict attention to a single server.
The second design feature of the protocol is that agents retain a list of keys
rather than just one key. They discard an old key as invalid t units of time
after having received a more up-to-date key, where t is set with respect to
the delay in the network. Keys are distributed only when an agent sends a
request to the server. An agent will make such a request when he wants to
send a multicast message, or if he receives a message encrypted under a key he
doesn’t know. In both cases, he will send a message to the server giving the
ID number of the newest key he has, and the server will send back all newer
keys. Only the newest key is used for multicast broadcasting.
This retention of a list of keys was shown in Taghdiri and Jackson’s analysis
to lead to major security problems. The most serious attack involved members
of the group accepting messages from a principal outside the group. A member
of the group A can simply broadcast a message from inside the group, leave,
and then broadcast a message using the same key. Though the group key has
been updated as a result of A leaving, the other agents in the group will still
accept the second message as valid as they all have the old key. To counter
this, Taghdiri and Jackson suggested changes to the protocol. Each agent
should retain only the most recent key he has received, and upon receiving a
multicast message, should contact the server to conﬁrm that it is encrypted
under the newest key. This may result in some message loss, because delays
in the network might mean that by the time a multicast message has been
received and a key request sent to the server, the group key has changed, but
this was reckoned to be acceptable compared to the potential security breach.
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It is the improved version of the protocol we have modelled and analysed
using Coral. In doing so we were aiming to address one major oversight of
the Taghdiri–Jackson analysis, namely the lack of an active intruder in their
model. An active intruder of some kind has been assumed since the very
ﬁrst security protocol paper, [20]. His behaviour was formalised by Dolev
and Yao, [11], and since then it has generally been accepted that the spy
should also be able to pose as a legitimate agent, as for example in Lowe’s
famous attack, [13]. If anything, compared to a unicast protocol, it would
seem even more likely that a multicast protocol would be subject to attack by
an active intruder, as argued in [18]. There are inherently more opportunities
for interception of traﬃc, and the ‘crowd’ of principals would typically make it
easier for an intruder to pose as another legitimate principal. Such protocols
should therefore be subjected to analysis under the full Dolev-Yao attacker
model, as is standard for unicast protocols.
The Tanaka-Sato protocol assumes the existence of a unicast authentica-
tion protocol that allows the server to establish an individual key (IK) with a
new member joining the group. This IK is used to encrypt all communication
between that member and the server. We model the underlying authentica-
tion protocol by assuming the existence of a long-term key shared by each
valid potential member of the group with the KDS. Since we are looking for
attacks on the protocol rather than trying to verify it, we can easily justify
this. We can simply take the attacks we discover and examine them to see if
the speciﬁc way we implemented the authentication phase was exploited. The
attacks described in this paper would be eﬀective for any initial authentica-
tion protocol. Additionally, we make the standard assumption that the spy
has access to a valid long-term key.
Here is a description of the improved version of the protocol as described
by Taghdiri and Jackson, and as modelled in this paper:
Joining the Group
1. Mi → S : {| join }| KMi
2. S → Mi : {| IkMi, Gk(n)}| KMi
In message 1, Mi wants to join the group, so sends a join request under his
long-term key KMi. The server generates a fresh individual key , IkM i, and a
new group key Gk(n). Each group key has a unique ID number (n). The new
individual key and group key are sent to the joining member in message 2.
Leaving the Group
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1. Mi → S : {| leave }| IkMi
2. S → Mi : {| ack.leave }| IkMi
In message 1, Mi sends a request to leave encrypted under his individual key
Ik. The server acknowledges the leave in message 2, and generates a new
group key. The new group key is not distributed yet though. In fact, if
another membership change occurs before a request for a key is received, it
will never be distributed.
Sending a message
1. Mi → S : {| send, n}| IkMi
2. S → Mi : {| n
′, Gk(n′)}| IkMi
3. Mi → ALL : {| message }| Gk(n′)
In message 1, agent Mi signals to the server that he would like to send a mes-
sage by sending what the protocol designers call a ‘sequence request’ message
together with the ID number of the newest key he has, n. The server checks
that Mi is in the group, and then sends back the newest key Gk(n
′). If no joins
or leaves have occurred since Mi last received a key, it may be that n = n
′,
but this will not be the case in general. In message 3, agent Mi broadcasts
his message to the group.
Receiving a message
1. Mj → S : {| read, n}| IkMj
2. S → Mj : {| Gk(n
′)}| IkMj
Suppose a multicast message has been broadcast, as in message 3 of the ‘send-
ing a message’ fragment above. When another agent Mj receives the message,
he ﬁrst sends a request to the server for the newest key. He then receives
the newest key Gk(n′), and will only accept the multicast message if it was
encrypted under that key.
Commentary
The revised protocol as proposed by Taghdiri and Jackson contains some re-
dundancy as a result of their security improvements. For example, there is
no reason for the server to send the key to a new member when he joins,
since he is required to ask for a key update whenever he sends or receives
a multicast message. Additionally, the sequence number sent in the request
for a key update before sending a message also seems redundant. Previously,
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the server would have used it to decide which keys to send back, but in the
revised version, the server only ever sends back the most recent key. It would
be better to replace this with a nonce, as we argue after presenting the attacks
we discovered, in §3.2.
3.1 Modelling in Coral
Coral’s model is a ﬁrst-order version of Paulson’s inductive model, [21]. We
enforce strong typing on message elements by using a sorted signature, with
unary functions acting as sort constraints. A protocol is modelled as the set of
all possible traces, i.e. all possible sequences of messages sent by any number
of honest users under the speciﬁcation of the protocol and, additionally, faked
messages sent by the intruder. A trace of messages is modelled as a list. Horn
clauses deﬁne how a valid trace may be extended by honest agents as speciﬁed
by the protocol. Further clauses model the knowledge the intruder can learn
from previous messages in the trace, using the same synth and analz operators
that Paulson uses. To search for attacks, we pose conjectures about security
properties exactly as Paulson does. Coral then searches for counterexamples,
eﬀectively by a backwards search, i.e. it goes from a state violating the security
property backwards to see if there is a valid trace reaching that state. More
details of our model and the operation of Coral are available in [24].
A feature of our model was that all the information about the state of the
system, i.e. the state and knowledge of all the principals involved, was stored
in the trace and inferred from the trace each time it was needed. First-order
rules can then be used to add an arbitrary number of messages to the trace
in a single instant. This was particularly useful when we were modelling the
Asokan–Ginzboorg group key agreement protocol, as it allowed us to create
a general model for any group size, [24]. However, for the Taghdiri-Jackson
protocol, this was not so helpful. Some information about the state of the
system does not normally appear in the trace. For example, when an agent
leaves the group, the server generates a new key, but this key does not appear
in the trace. Additionally, our model follows Paulson’s original design in that
is does not include a ‘gets’ event to model message reception, such as Bella
later introduced to Paulson’s model, [5]. The only events in the trace are
‘sent’ events, and in the presence of a Dolev-Yao attacker, these messages
may never be received by their intended recipients. This makes it hard to
work out who is legitimately in the group at a particular time, which is vital
when modelling the control conditions, i.e. tests that honest agents apply
before sending a protocol message. Even with a ‘gets’ event, a lot of digging
through message trace would be required to determine group composition,
and we would need to do this almost every time an agent sent a message,
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creating an enormous search problem. So, the model was changed to include
some information about the state of the principals. The unary function m()
that was previously used to store just the message trace is now an arity 4
function storing the trace, a counter, the current group key stored by the
server, and the composition of the group stored as a list of triples. The triples
store the agents name, the individual key which he shares with the server for
this session in the group, and the most recent group multicast key he has
received. We deﬁne a boolean function ingroup on these lists of triples that
determine whether or not a particular agent is in the group. A further change
is our modelling of freshness. We used to use the parts operator as used by
Paulson, but in our model for this protocol, we have a counter, and use this
to model fresh values. Our motivation for this was that so many fresh values
have to be created in a typical scenario, for individual keys, group keys and
multicast messages, that our checking of the parts literals would quickly slow
down the search process. We model multicast messages as hello(T ), where T
is the counter value when the message was sent, thus ensuring all (honestly
sent) messages are unique.
Having chosen to use a counter-based model, we introduced a new pruning
rule to Coral: if the counter variable occurs in term X inside an antecedent
literal ingroup(X ,Y ,Z ) = true , then the clause is redundant, since this would
require an agent at some point in the past to have joined the group and
obtained a group key or individual key that is only available now. A similar
check is applied to member(X ,Y ) = true literals. This eliminates a lot of
unreachable states from the search. This rule could be generally applied to
backward searching tools using a tick based model.
As an illustration, in Figure 1, we give the clauses required for modelling
the sub-protocol for the sending of multicast messages. Note that in a further
change from our original model used in [24], we record the composition of the
group at each point in time in the fourth argument of the sent constructor.
This is important for making conjectures about security properties later on.
Note also that ingroup is an arity 3 function, with the third argument returning
the list of group members without the agent named in the ﬁrst argument.
This is used when agents leave the group or update their keys, as in the
third clause in Figure 1. A further point to note is that we still infer state
information about principals from the trace, for example to decide if they
should be expecting a key update message in the third clause. Our new model
is something of a hybrid between a Paulson style trace model and a state-based
model like that used, for example, in [4].
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%% SEND a message
m(Trace,Group,Keysequence,Tick)=true ∧
ingroup(triple(principal(Mi),Ikey,key(Sq)),Group,Newgp)=true
→ m(cons(sent(Mi,server,encr(send(Sq),Ikey),Group),Trace),Group,
Keysequence,s(Tick))=true
%% server gives key
m(Trace,Group,Keysequence,Tick)=true ∧
ingroup(triple(principal(Mi),Ikey,Oldk),Group,Newgp)=true ∧
member(sent(X,server,encr(send(Sq),Ikey),Tgroup),Trace)=true
→m(cons(sent(server,Mi,encr(pair(key(Keysequence),send(Sq)),Ikey),group),Trace),
Group,Keysequence,s(Tick))=true
%% agent broadcasts his message, updates his key
m(Trace,Group,Keysequence,Tick)=true ∧
ingroup(triple(principal(Mi),Ikey,Oldk),Group,Newgp)=true ∧
member(sent(X,Mi,encr(pair(key(Xk),send(Sq)),Ikey),Tg1),Trace)=true ∧
member(sent(Mi,server,encr(send(Sq),Ikey),Tg2),Trace)=true
→m(cons(sent(Mi,all,encr(hello(s(Tick)),key(Xk)),
cons(triple(principal(Mi),Ikey,key(Xk)),Newgp)),
Trace),cons(triple(principal(Mi),Ikey,key(Xk)),Newgp),
Keysequence,s(Tick))=true
Fig. 1. Clauses for modelling the ‘send’ sub-protocol
3.2 Attacking the Protocol
In [22], Pereira and Quisquater attempt to lay down a list of desirable security
properties for group protocols. They deﬁne implicit key authentication, that an
outsider cannot learn the group key; two ﬂavours of perfect forward secrecy, i.e.
that the compromise of long-term keys does not compromise past session keys;
and resistance to known-key attacks, i.e. that compromise of session keys does
not lead to the loss of future session keys. However, the properties Taghdiri
and Jackson found not to be satisﬁed by the original protocol design fall
outside of this categorisation. Essentially, this is because we are analysing a
protocol for managing a group key for an evolving group, not just establishing
a key for a static one.
The property vital to a key management protocol is that throughout the
evolution of the group, agents currently outside the group should not be ac-
cepted as group members by the agents inside the group. We could perhaps
call this multicast group authenticity. For this protocol, this property has two
ﬂavours: the ﬁrst, which Taghdiri and Jackson call ‘outsider can’t read’, im-
plies that no agent outside the group should be able to read a message sent
by a member of the group. The second, which they call ‘outsider can’t send’,
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implies that members of the group should not accept as valid a message sent
from outside the group.
Posing security conjectures in an inductive formalism requires some
thought. We must translate an abstract idea of authenticity into a property
expressed in terms of messages in the trace. For group protocol properties,
our trace includes the composition of the group at each point, which becomes
important now. For the property ‘outsider can’t read’, we need to express the
fact that when our dishonest agent is indeed outside the group, and a message
is sent by an honest player under a key Gk , the spy does not know this key.
So, we posed the property as a conjecture to Coral in this form:
% For honest agent Mj
eqagent(Mj,spy)=false ∧
% There is a trace containing the sequence of
% messages for Mj broadcasting to the group under Gk
m(cons(sent(Mj,all,encr(hello(Y),Gk),Xgroup),
cons(sent(X,Mj,encr(pair(Gk,send(Sq2)),Ikey),Xgroup),
cons(sent(Mj,server,encr(send(Sq2),Ikey),Xgroup),
Trace))),Group,Keyseq,Tick)=true ∧
% and the spy is not in the group
ingroup(triple(principal(spy),X3,X2),Xgroup,Newgp)=false ∧
% but the spy has the key Gk
in(Gk,analz(Trace)=true →
This conjecture is negative, i.e. it states there should be no trace Trace
ending with the 3 messages speciﬁed in the ﬁrst literal, with the spy outside
the group, and with the message hello(y) being sent under a key the spy knows
(analz (X ) is the set of terms the spy can learn from a trace X). The three ﬁnal
messages had to be speciﬁed together because otherwise Coral (correctly)
ﬁnds a rather trivial attack where the spy leaves the group between the server
sending a key update out to Mj and Mj broadcasting his message. Then he
can read the message quite legitimately, since he was in the group when it
was sent. Given the above conjecture, Coral gives the counterexample in
Figure 2. This is an attack on the protocol which hinges on the spy sending
a replayed key update message in message 13. Since the key may or may not
have changed since she last saw it, agent a will accept this key. The problem
is that there is minimal freshness information sent in the request for a key
(just the sequence number of the key an agent currently holds). Enclosing
a fresh nonce inside the package sent to the server requesting a key update
would blunt this attack.
Having discovered this attack, we realised that there is a similar one
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1. spy → server : {| spy}| longtermK(spy)
2. server → spy : {| ik(1), Gk(1)}| longtermK(spy)
3. a → server : {| a}| longtermK(a)
4. server → a : {| ik(3), Gk(2)}| longtermK(a)
5. spy → server : {| send(1)}| ik(1)
6. server → spy : {| Gk(2), send(1)}| ik(1)
7. a → server : {| send(2)}| ik(3)
8. server → a : {| Gk(2), send(2)}| ik(3)
9. a → all : {| hello(9)}| Gk(2)
10. spy → server : {| leave}| ik(1)
11. server → spy : {| ackleave}| ik(1)
12. a → server : {| send(2)}| ik(3)
13. spy → a : {| Gk(2), send(2)}| ik(3)
14. a → all : {| hello(14)}| Gk(2)
Fig. 2. First attack on the Tanaka-Sato/Taghdiri-Jackson Protocol
whereby a spy can send a message from outside the group and have it accepted
by an agent inside the group, thus breaking the multicast group authenticity
property, ‘outsider can’t send’. We gave an appropriate conjecture to Coral
for conﬁrmation, and it discovered the counterexample in Figure 3. Like the
previous attack, this is also a replay attack, in this case with the spy replaying
message 8 in message 13, tricking agent a into thinking that message 11 came
from a legitimate member of the group. Replay attacks are in general more
serious in the context of a group key management protocol. A replay attack
on a standard unicast protocol typically assumes that it would be possible for
a spy to obtain a short-term key by cryptanalysis or some other means, and so
it would constitute an attack on the protocol if he was able to force an agent
to accept an old key. In the two attacks above, no cryptanalysis in necessary,
since the spy can obtain some old keys by joining the group legitimately, and
then leave before eﬀecting the attack. However, even if we assume the spy
does not have access to a valid long-term key, and so cannot join the group,
these replay attacks are still dangerous. If the spy obtains a short-term group
key by cryptanalysis, he can eﬀect an attack without joining the group.
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1. a → server : {| a}| longtermK(a)
2. server → a : {| ik(1), Gk(1)}| longtermK(a)
3. spy → server : {| spy}| longtermK(spy)
4. server → spy : {| ik(3), Gk(2)}| longtermK(spy)
5. spy → server : {| read}| ik(3)
6. server → spy : {| Gk(2)}| ik(3)
7. a → server : {| read}| ik(1)
8. server → a : {| Gk(2)}| ik(1)
9. spy → server : {| leave}| ik(3)
10. server → spy : {| ackleave}| ik(3)
11. spy → all : {| hello(12)}| Gk(2)
12. a → server : {| read}| ik(1)
13. spy → a : {| Gk(2)}| ik(1)
Fig. 3. Second attack on the Tanaka-Sato/Taghdiri-Jackson Protocol
The second attack can also be prevented by adding a fresh nonce to the
request for a key, this time for reading a message, and including it in the reply
from the server. A complete listing of the protocol model ﬁle is available at
http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/s9808756/tanaka-sato/.
4 The Iolus Protocol
The main diﬀerence between the Iolus protocol and the Taghdiri-Jackson ver-
sion of the Tanaka-Sato protocol is that Iolus eagerly distributes new keys,
whereas Tanaka-Sato distributes keys only on demand, i.e. as and when mem-
bers of the group want to send or read messages.
Joining the Group
1. Mi → S : {| join }| KMi
2. S → Mi : {| IkMi, Gkn′}| KMi
3. S → ALL : {| Gkn′}| Gkn
Members join the Iolus protocol in the same way as for Tanaka-Sato, i.e. by
use of a pairwise authentication protocol that we model with the use of a
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long-term key. The server generates a fresh individual key , IkM i, and a new
group key with ID n′, Gkn′. In message 2, the group key is sent to the new
member, and in message 3, it is sent to the old members of the group under
the old group key, Gkn.
Leaving the Group
1. Mi → S : {| leave }| IkMi
2. S → ALL : [ { | Gkn′} | IkMj . . .] ∀j =
i,Mj ∈group
When a member Mi leaves, a new key Gkn′ is generated, and sent to each
member in the form of a broadcast list. The list contains the new group key
encrypted under the pairwise session key of each member still in the group
(the key cannot be broadcast under the old group key, because this would give
it away to the leaving member).
Sending a message
1. Mi → ALL : {| message }| Gk(n)
The message is simply broadcast under the current group key.
4.1 Modelling Iolus
No changes were required to the framework of the Coral model to formalise
the Iolus protocol. Though the protocol distributes new keys eagerly rather
than lazily, the operations are similar to those used in the Tanaka-Sato pro-
tocol. The most complex part of the model concerns the second message of
the ‘leave’ sub protocol. Here we must model the generation of an appropri-
ate key update list for an arbitrary group. This is a straightforward task in
our ﬁrst-order model. We deﬁne a recursive function rekey that generates
an appropriate rekeying message for a given group and given fresh group key.
This function works correctly in all modes of instantiation, i.e. given a rekey-
ing message it will return an appropriate group and key. This is important
in our backwards search process. The use of an auxiliary rekey function is
similar to our use of the all msg2s received function in our model of the
Asokan–Ginzboorg protocol, [24]. Being able to make these kinds of recur-
sive calculations seems (perhaps unsurprisingly) to be important in modelling
group protocols, and our ﬁrst-order logic model is well suited to them.
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4.2 Attacking Iolus
Having posed security conjectures for the Tanaka-Sato/Taghdiri-Jackson pro-
tocol above, formulating an appropriate conjecture for the Iolus protocol was
easier. Again, we are investigating multicast group authenticity, i.e. that those
outside the group cannot successfully impersonate those inside the group, ei-
ther by sending or receiving messages. However, since keys are supplied ea-
gerly, we do not have the same division of this property into ‘outside can’t
read’ and ‘outsider can’t send’ conjectures. Instead we have to look at the
possible ways keys can be updated. The desirable property is: when a key
update to key Gk is accepted by a member of a group, and that group does
not contain the spy, then the spy should not know the key Gk . We formulate
this property with respect to the updates sent after a group member leaves
like this:
% For honest agent Mj
eqagent(Mj,spy)=false ∧
% Mj accepts an update to key Gk
m(cons(sent(X,all,cons(encr(Gk,Ikey),Rest),
cons(triple(Mj,Ikey,OldGk),Restgp)),Trace),
Group,Xk,Tick)=true ∧
% the spy is not in the group
ingroup(triple(principal(spy),Y,Z),Restgp,Newgp)=false ∧
% but he knows the key
in(Gk,analz(Trace))=true →
Again this is a negative conjecture suggesting that for the protocol to be se-
cure, no trace should exist where the spy knows a key Gk accepted by group
member Mj when the spy is outside the group. Coral ﬁnds the counterexam-
ple in Figure 4 4 . Again this is a replay attack. In message 14, the spy replays
a key update originally sent in message 11, while he was still in the group.
So, the spy knows the group key Gk(4) even though he is no longer a group
member. Note for this attack to work, it is necessary for two honest agents
to join the group as well as the spy, whereas only one was required for the
previous attacks, and note further that Coral has discovered this for itself -
there is no pre-setting of the number of agents. Preventing this attack is not
as straightforward as it was for the Tanaka-Sato/Taghdiri-Jackson protocol
because the key updates are unsolicited, so there is no opportunity for the
agents and the server to exchange a nonce. The only way to protect against
replays would seem to be to include a timestamp inside the encrypted packages
4 In Coral’s inductive model, we have an arbitrary and unbounded number of agents, so
the ﬁrst agent is called a, the second s(a), and so on.
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1. a → server : {| a}| longtermK(a)
2. server → all : {| Gk(1)}| Gk(X8)
3. server → a : {| ik(2), Gk(1)}| longtermK(a)
4. spy → server : {| spy}| longtermK(spy)
5. server → all : {| Gk(2)}| Gk(1)
6. server → spy : {| ik(5), Gk(2)}| longtermK(spy)
7. s(a) → server : {| s(a)}| longtermK(s(a))
8. server → all : {| Gk(3)}| Gk(2)
9. server → s(a) : {| ik(8), Gk(3)}| longtermK(s(a))
10. a → server : {| leave}| ik(2)
11. server → all : [{| Gk(4)}| ik(8), {| Gk(4)}| ik(5)]
12. spy → server : {| leave}| ik(5)
13. server → all : [{| Gk(5)}| ik(8)]
14. spy → all : [{| Gk(4)}| ik(8), {| Gk(4)}| ik(5)]
Fig. 4. Attack on the Iolus Protocol
sent in key updates, both when agents join and leave the group. This would
require all group members to have at least loosely synchronised clocks, and
would further require a decision in advance about the lifetime of group keys
and the expected amount of delay in the network. However, this limitation
seems inescapable for such protocols. In the presence of a Dolev-Yao spy it
is insuﬃcient, for example, to include the last key in the key update message
as freshness information, since the spy may prevent this message from being
received, and then re-send it once he has left the group.
A complete listing of the Iolus protocol model ﬁle is available at
http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/s9808756/iolus/.
5 Lessons from the Case Studies
We have seen in these case studies the re-emergence in new protocols of over-
sights made by the designers of the ﬁrst security protocols. As we argued in
§3.2, replay attacks like the ones we discovered are even more serious in the
context of a multicast key management protocol, and do not even require the
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spy to have full Dolev-Yao capabilities - he need only be able to replay an
old message, he does not need to stop a message from being received or break
messages apart. Our ﬁx for the Iolus protocol requires timestamps to be used
in the protocol, which is not wholly desirable, but seems the only solution for
multicast protocols that eagerly update keys. For on-demand rekeying such
as is used in the Tanaka-Sato protocol, a nonce exchange can be used.
In terms of automated group protocol analysis, we have seen that Coral’s
inductive model, a ﬁrst-order version of Paulson’s, is well suited to modelling
group key management protocols. The protocols involve an unbounded num-
ber of agents, each of whom may play a role in diﬀerent sub-protocols an un-
bounded number of times. Coral’s inductive model handles this naturally.
Again we have seen the value of a model that does not require us to pre-set
the number of agents involved in a group - only two agents were required
for the attacks on the Tanaka-Sato/Taghdiri-Jackson protocol, but three are
necessary for the Iolus protocol attack. Coral discovered this for itself.
There were two weaker aspects to Coral’s performance: one was the dif-
ﬁculty of posing conjectures. For the ﬁrst case study, it took several attempts
to pose the security property in such a way that counterexamples really were
attacks. This is particularly annoying when it takes several hours to get the
counterexample. Some of the diﬃculty comes from the fact that is not trivial
to translate the kinds of authenticity properties required of unicast protocols
to group protocol situations. As we saw is §3.2, the properties outlined by
Pereira and Quisquater for group key establishment protocols are also un-
suitable for a dynamic group situation. For example, the property of perfect
forward secrecy, where the compromise of long-term secrets does not lead to
the compromise of past sessions, does not hold for either of the protocols anal-
ysed in this paper, since they both assume an authentication protocol using
long-term secrets is used to set up the pairwise keys for communication with
the server. Compromise of these would lead to the compromise of all session
keys from the period when the compromised agent was in the group. The
Iolus protocol quite trivially does not satisfy the property of resistance to
known key attacks. New session keys are always distributed under old session
keys, so the compromise of one will lead to the loss of all subsequent keys. It
is clear the designers of these multicast key management protocols have not
aimed to provide these properties. Instead, we have identiﬁed multicast group
authenticity as the key property, i.e. throughout the evolution of the group,
keys used by group members must be known only to other group members.
This proves to be quite a tricky property to express formally, and not just
in Coral, as we learnt from our experiments with the AVISPA SATMC tool
(see below). Having analysed the ﬁrst protocol, it was much easier to form the
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property required for the second. There has been some work on automating
the process of formulating conjectures in the inductive model, [19], and this
could perhaps be adapted to formulate properties for group key management
protocols.
The second weaker aspect of Coral’s performance was the run times (up
to 3.5 hours to ﬁnd the second attack). This seems to be because the mixed
trace based and state based nature of the model led Coral to explore a lot
of unreachable states. This we hope to address with a revised model storing
more state information. We are working on an interface to the intermediate
format used in the AVISPA project (see for example [4]). Thus we hope to
take advantage of the eﬀorts being made to extend HLSPL to group protocols
to facilitate further testing of Coral. With the help of L. Compagna, we
have also been experimenting with one of the current AVISPA back-ends, the
SATMC tool, [1], to see if these protocols can be modelled and the same
attacks found. Some signiﬁcant work will be needed to model the protocols
in a completely general way, without restrictions on the number of agents
and sub-protocol roles. Also, it seems that modelling key update in the Iolus
protocol will require the ability to reason explicitly about lists. We have found
that posing group security conjectures in the AVISPA intermediate format is
also diﬃcult. In particular, it is not straightforward to express multicast group
authenticity. Not being able to reason about the order in which events took
place, and who was in the group at the time, further complicates the issue.
However, with appropriate extensions to the intermediate format and some
more work, we expect be able to rediscover the attacks in much faster times.
6 Conclusions
We were pleased with the way Coral performed on these protocols. Firstly,
the use of an inductive model meant we didn’t have to make fundamental
changes to our modelling strategy to accommodate an open-ended protocol
with an unbounded number of agents, joins, leaves, messages sent and received
etc. Secondly, modelling at the ﬁrst-order Horn clause level in a theorem
prover meant making the adaptations required to store and manipulate a list
of current group members was just an evening’s work. Thirdly, Coral was
able to discover attacks requiring a long trace of messages to be sent, indicating
it has scaled up well, despite exploring a model without any pre-setting of the
number of agents, joins and leaves etc.
There are dozens of protocols for this scenario in the literature, most of
which have received little or no formal attention. Our experience so far sug-
gests that they are likely to be vulnerable to attack. Since the ﬁeld of standard
protocol analysis is already mature, this would seem to be a great opportunity
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for the automated reasoning/formal methods community to solve an outstand-
ing problem and prove the worth of their methods. Two pre-requisites for this
are the extension of protocol speciﬁcation languages to group protocols, which
is already underway, and the establishment of a corpus of group protocols
together with attacks found or veriﬁcation results achieved. This we are be-
ginning to do: see http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/s9808756/group-protocol-corpus/.
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